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The Islamic headscarf, an innocuous piece of cloth worn by Muslim women in 
accordance with their religious beliefs, has for years been the subject of controversy. 
Muslim women claim a right to wear the headscarf in accordance with their religious 
beliefs while the Western world views the headscarf as a symbol of oppression and 
terrorism forced onto women by a patriarchal religion. The debate has grown in 
recent times with the increasing visibility of the Muslim population and their 
assertiveness of their Islamic identity and human rights.1 
However, unlike other disputes regarding the compatibility of religious practices with 
modern values, the debate has not been confined to the private sphere to be 
resolved among members of the religion. States are embroiled in the debate and 
have gone so far as to enact legislation prohibiting the wearing of a headscarf. This 
article critically examines the reasons underlying these bans and argues that these 
prohibitions are not justified from any human rights perspective. Section 2 analyses 
the place of the headscarf in Islam, its religious basis and significance to Muslim 
women. Section 3 examines bans on the headscarf in France, Turkey and 
Switzerland in order to identify the most popular justifications advanced for banning 
the headscarf. Section 4 argues that the reasons advanced by many European states 
and accepted by courts for banning the headscarf do not justify a headscarf ban. 
Section 5 explores whether or not a headscarf ban would be upheld by South African 
courts. 
  
∗  Fatima Osman. B Bus Sci (Law), LLB, LLM (UCT). Admitted attorney and lecturer, Department of 
Private Law (University of Cape Town). Email: Fatima.Osman@uct.ac.za. Thank you to Prof 
Danwood Chirwa and Prof Debbie Collier for their comments on an earlier draft of this article.  
1  McGoldrick Human Rights and Religion 1. 
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2. The headscarf and Islam 
The term "headscarf" refers to the head covering worn by Muslim women in 
accordance with their religious beliefs. It is generally worn to completely conceal a 
woman's hair, neck and ears, whilst leaving the face exposed.2 The obligation to 
wear a headscarf in Islam is derived from the Qur'an. The Qur'an states: 
And say to the believing women that they should lower their gaze and guard their 
modesty, that they should not display their beauty and ornaments except that what 
must ordinarily appear thereof; that they should draw their veils over their bosoms 
and that they should not display their beauty except to their husbands, their 
fathers, their husbands' fathers, their sons, their husbands' sons, their brothers or 
their brothers' sons, or their sisters' sons, or their women or the slaves whom their 
right hands possess, or male servants free of physical needs, or small children who 
have no sense of the shame of sex and that they should not stroke their feet in 
order to draw attention to their hidden ornaments.3 [Emphasis added] 
O Prophet! Tell thy wives and daughters, and the believing women, that they 
should cast their outer garments over their persons (when abroad). That is most 
convenient, that they should be known, (As such) and not molested.4 [Emphasis 
added] 
While the preceding Qur'anic verses do not explicitly refer to a headscarf, they are 
generally interpreted to require Muslim women who have reached puberty to wear a 
headscarf when in public. Commentators of the Qur'an provide the context of the 
preceding Qur'anic verses. They explain that during the pre-Islamic era women 
would cover their hair but would tie the covering in such a way so as to leave the 
neck, ears and chest exposed.5 The command to cover the chest was therefore to 
compel women to now cover the neck, ears and breasts with the aim of protecting 
the modesty of women.6 The Qur'anic verses are also read in conjunction with the 
hadith7 in which it is reported that the Prophet Muhammad (may peace be upon 
2  This article does not consider a legislative ban of the veil which conceals the face and leaves 
only the eyes exposed. While a ban on the veil may have similar implications for women who 
consider the veil to be obligatory, a veil raises distinct issues in respect of communication, the 
assessment of facial expressions and the recognition of individuals. This article examines the 
justifications for the ban of the far less restrictive headscarf.  
3  Surah 24, Verse 31, reproduced in Ali Meaning of the Holy Qur'an 873-874. 
4  Surah 33, Verse 59, reproduced in Ali Meaning of the Holy Qur'an 1077. 
5  Madani Hijab 32.  
6  Madani Hijab 32. 
7  These are the recorded sayings or actions of the Prophet Muhammad (may peace be upon him). 
It is Islamic practice to confer peace and salutations on the Prophet Muhammad whenever his 
name is mentioned and this is why I have used the words "may peace be upon him". 
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him) upon seeing Asma bint Abu Bakr wearing thin clothes indicated that upon 
reaching puberty a woman should cover her entire body except her hands and face 
when in public.8 
Consequently, the four main schools of Islamic jurisprudence,9 which represent the 
dominant mainstream understanding of Islamic law, have interpreted the Qur'anic 
verses to mean that females upon reaching puberty are obliged to cover their heads 
in public.10 Historically, Muslim scholars have agreed that Muslim women are obliged 
to cover their heads in public and debate has revolved around whether Muslim 
women are also obliged to cover their face and hands in public.11 
Accordingly, the general consensus amongst Muslim scholars is that the headscarf is 
obligatory in Islam. The obligation extends to all activities including work and school, 
and is not relaxed even for brief periods of physical activity. The headscarf should 
thus not be regarded merely as a religious symbol such as a cross worn by some 
Christians but rather understood as a mandatory requirement of the Islamic faith. 
Furthermore, wearing a headscarf is also generally considered to be a manifestation 
of religion protected by the right to freedom of religion. The United Nations Human 
Rights Committee has stated that the observance and practice of religion includes, 
inter alia, the wearing of distinctive clothing or head coverings.12 This interpretation 
accords with the more recent jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights 
("ECtHR") which has in Dahlab v Switzerland13 and Sahin v Turkey14 assumed that 
wearing a headscarf is a religious practice and decided both cases on the basis of 
whether the interference with religious freedom was justifiable. South Africa,15 like 
8  ad-Darsh Muslim Women's Dress 7-8. Some scholars consider this hadith to be weak and 
unreliable and argue that women are obliged to cover their faces and hands when in public.  
9  The four schools, being Shafi'i, Hanafi, Maliki and Hanbali, represent different schools of thought 
on the interpretation of religious material and are named after the Muslim jurists who founded the 
school of thought. 
10  ad-Darsh Muslim Women's Dress 8; Ahmad Encyclopaedia of Islamic Jurisprudence 351-359; 
Mutahhari Islamic Modest Dress 51-55. 
11  Mutahhari Islamic Modest Dress 59-71; Madani Hijab xv. 
12  CCPR General Comment No 22: Article 18 (Freedom of Thought, Conscience or Religion) 
CCPR/C/21/Rev1/Add4 (1993) para 4. 
13  Dahlab v Switzerland Application No 42393/98 ECHR (2001) (hereafter Dahlab v Switzerland). 
14  Leyla Sahin v Turkey (Application 44774/98) 45 ILM 436 (2006) (hereafter Leyla Sahin v Turkey). 
15  MEC for Education, KwaZulu Natal v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474 (CC) (hereafter MEC for Education v 
Pillay). 
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the United States of America,16 Canada17 and Germany,18 adopts a subjective test 
for determining whether conduct constitutes a protectable manifestation of religion. 
The subjective test protects conduct based on sincerely held religious beliefs and 
does not require claimants to prove that the conduct is an objective requirement of 
their religion. This means that, in the absence of real evidence that a claimant is 
acting fraudulently, wearing a headscarf would be protected by religious freedom in 
these jurisdictions. 
Accordingly, any assessment as to the justifiability of a headscarf ban must take 
cognisance of the fact that the headscarf is regarded as a mandatory requirement of 
the Islamic faith and generally considered to be protected by the right to freedom of 
religion. 
3. Legislative bans of the headscarf 
3.1 France 
In France, the debate regarding the banning of the headscarf began in 1989 when a 
school suspended 3 Muslim girls for wearing headscarves to school.19 The debate 
culminated in the 2004 French law prohibiting students in public schools from 
wearing clothing manifesting a religious affiliation20 (hereinafter referred to as "the 
French Headscarf Ban"). The French Headscarf Ban states: 
In public elementary, middle and high schools, the wearing of signs or clothing 
which conspicuously manifest students' religious affiliations is prohibited. 
Disciplinary procedures to implement this rule will be preceded by a discussion with 
the student. The clothing and religious signs prohibited are conspicuous signs such 
as a large cross, a veil or a skullcap. Not regarded as signs indicating religious 
affiliation are discreet signs, which can ... be medallions, small crosses, stars of 
David, hands of Fatima, or small Korans.21 [Emphasis added] 
16  Thomas v Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division 45 US 707. 
17  Syndicat Northcrest v Amselem [2004] 2 SCR 551. 
18  Von Campenhausen 2004 BYU L Rev 678, which discusses the German Federal Constitutional 
Court's approach of determining if a practice is protected by religious freedom by looking at the 
subjective beliefs of the claimant and not the general and universal requirements of the religion. 
19  Beller 2003-2004 TILJ 582-583. 
20  Welch 2007 Denning LJ 201. 
21  Barbibay 2010 CJICL 177-178. 
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The Stasi Commission, which had been commissioned to report on issues associated 
with laïcité, recommended a headscarf ban along with a number of other measures 
to protect laïcité.22 However, only the headscarf ban was enacted. Laïcité is the 
French constitutional principle that requires the public sphere to be neutral and 
religion and all manifestations thereof to be confined to the private sphere.23 French 
politicians explained the law on the basis of protecting laïcité and maintaining the 
secular nature of state schools.24 Weil,25 a member of the Stasi Commission, 
furthermore explained the ban as being necessary to prevent Muslim girls from 
being coerced by their families and communities into wearing headscarves. In 
support of this, Weil26 stated that teachers and parents described an unmanageable 
situation at schools with girls being removed from public schools to avoid the 
pressure to wear a headscarf. According to Weil,27 the majority of Muslim girls who 
did not wear a headscarf in fact requested the headscarf ban to protect against such 
pressure. 
Interestingly, Weil28 emphatically stated that the Stasi Commission did not 
recommend the ban because it viewed the headscarf as a symbol of the subjugation 
of women and explained that such an interpretation could not justify banning the 
headscarf. Weil29 conceded that the headscarf may have different meanings, such as 
being an expression of belief and identity,30 and banning the headscarf because it 
symbolises the subjugation of women would constitute "an intrusive interpretation of 
a religious symbol" which may infringe on state neutrality in respect of religion. 
  
22  Bowen Why the French Don't Like Headscarves 112-113. 
23  Bienkowski 2010 RJLR 439; for a detailed discussion on the meaning of laïcité see Idriss 2005 
Legal Studies 260-263. 
24  Boustead 2007 J Transnat'l L & Pol'y 189. 
25  Thomas 2005 Dialectical Anthropology 382-383; see also Idriss 2005 Legal Studies 277. 
26  Weil 2009 Cardozo L Rev 2707. 
27  Weil 2009 Cardozo L Rev 2707. 
28  Weil 2009 Cardozo L Rev 2705-2706. 
29  Weil 2009 Cardozo L Rev 2705-2706. 
30  For different interpretations of the headscarf also see Zhurnalova Religion in the Public Sphere 
298-299; McGoldrick Human Rights and Religion 61; and Poulter 1997 OJLS 71. 
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3.2 Turkey 
A headscarf ban is nowhere more surprising than in the predominantly Muslim 
country of Turkey. The Atatűrk revolution in the 1920s saw the end of Islamic rule in 
Turkey and the start of a concerted state attempt to eradicate traditional Islamic 
symbols, which were seen as a threat to a modern and secular Turkey, from the 
public sphere.31 Accordingly, state regulation of religious dress is not new in Turkey 
but was brought to the fore when Leyla Sahin challenged the controversial 
regulations prohibiting university students from wearing headscarves during classes 
in the ECtHR.32 The ban was based on the Istanbul University regulations stating 
that: 
By virtue of the Constitution, the law and regulations, and in accordance with the 
case law of the Supreme Administrative Court and the European Commission of 
Human Rights and the resolutions adopted by the university administrative boards, 
students whose "heads are covered" (who wear the Islamic headscarf) and 
students (including overseas students) with beards must not be admitted to 
lectures, courses or tutorials.33 [Emphasis added] 
The ban, which was upheld by the ECtHR,34 targeted the headscarf and was aimed 
at students in tertiary institutions, but has not been enforced since about September 
2010 when Turkey indicated that "it would support any student disciplined or 
expelled for covering her head".35 
Leyla Sahin was a fifth-year medical student who was refused access to 
examinations and lectures on her enrolment at Istanbul University on the basis that 
she wore a headscarf in contravention of the regulations.36 The ECtHR endorsed the 
approach of its Chamber, which held that the ban was necessary to preserve 
secularism, protect the equality rights of women and combat extremist political 
31  Bleiberg 2005-2006 Cornell L Rev 131. 
32  Leyla Sahin v Turkey. 
33  Leyla Sahin v Turkey 438 para 16. 
34  Leyla Sahin v Turkey. 
35  Head 2010 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-1180622. 
36  Leyla Sahin v Turkey 438 para 17. Sahin initially studied at Bursa University, enrolled at Istanbul 
University in 1997 during her fifth year, and claimed she had been wearing a headscarf during 
her 4 years at Bursa University, Leyla Sahin v Turkey 438 para 15. 
1323 
                                        
F OSMAN  PER / PELJ 2014(17)4 
movements which wished to impose on society their religious symbols and 
conception of a society founded on religious precepts.37 
The ECtHR held that the principle of secularism was the paramount consideration 
underlying the headscarf ban and held: 
In such a context, where the values of pluralism, respect for the rights of others, 
and in particular, equality before the law of men and women are being taught and 
applied in practice, it is understandable that the relevant authorities should wish to 
preserve the secular nature of the institution concerned and so consider it contrary 
to such values to allow religious attire, as in the present case, the Islamic 
headscarf, to be worn.38 
The ECtHR also suggested that the Islamic requirement that women wear a 
headscarf and the headscarf itself were inconsistent with the value of equality. The 
ECtHR endorsed its previous findings in Dahlab v Switzerland39 in which it held that: 
[the headscarf] appeared to be imposed on women by a religious precept that was 
hard to reconcile with the principle of gender equality. It also noted that wearing the 
Islamic headscarf could not easily be reconciled with the message of tolerance, 
respect for others and, above all, equality and non-discrimination that all teachers in 
a democratic society must convey to their pupils.40 
The judgment, however, did not elaborate on why or how the headscarf conflicts 
with equality, tolerance or respect for others or how the ban could curb extremism. 
Judge Tulkens, in a minority judgment, delivered an astute critique of the majority 
judgment which questioned how the majority simply accepted that the ban was 
necessary to protect secularism or achieve equality without explaining why or how 
this is so. Judge Tulkens stated that by simply assuming that the headscarf conflicts 
with secularism when there was no evidence to this effect, the majority placed its 
own interpretation upon the headscarf, which was unacceptable.41 The majority's 
evaluation of wearing a headscarf as a negative practice, which led to its upholding 
the ban, was criticised as an improper paternalistic approach, and Judge Tulkens 
37  Leyla Sahin v Turkey 453-4 para 115. 
38  Leyla Sahin v Turkey 454 para 116. 
39  Dahlab v Switzerland. 
40  Leyla Sahin v Turkey 452-3 para 111. 
41  Leyla Sahin v Turkey, dissenting opinion of judge Tulkens 462-464 paras 7-12. 
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noted that the principle of sexual equality could never justify prohibiting a woman 
from following a freely adopted practice.42 
3.3 Sw itzerland 
A headscarf ban may also be aimed at public officials and prohibit employees from 
wearing a headscarf whilst performing their professional duties. A prominent 
example of this is the case of Dahlab v Switzerland,43 in which Swiss educational 
authorities prohibited a primary school teacher from wearing a headscarf while 
teaching. 
Switzerland successfully defended its prohibition on wearing a headscarf in the 
ECtHR. The state relied on certain seemingly neutral statutory provisions which did 
not explicitly prohibit the headscarf but were argued to provide general values to 
which civil servants should adhere and which could be translated into specific 
orders,44 such as banning the headscarf. The state argued that the prohibition was 
meant to protect the principle of "denominational neutrality in schools" and to 
promote "religious harmony".45 The state argued that Dahlab as a civil servant was a 
representative of the state and her conduct should not suggest that the state 
endorsed a particular religion.46 The ECtHR held that the prohibition pursued the 
legitimate aims of protecting the rights and freedoms of others, public safety and 
public order,47 and seemed to implicitly accept that the prohibition was necessary to 
protect religious harmony and neutrality. 
A further critical aspect of the case was the young ages of the pupils taught by 
Dahlab. Dahlab taught pupils aged between four and eight and the ECtHR held that 
the prohibition on teachers wearing a headscarf was necessary to prevent the 
42  Leyla Sahin v Turkey, dissenting opinion of judge Tulkens 462-464 paras 7-12. 
43  Dahlab v Switzerland. 
44  "The public education system shall ensure that the political and religious beliefs of pupils and 
parents are respected" and "Civil servants must be lay persons; derogations from this provision 
shall be permitted only in respect of university teaching staff." Ss 6 and 12 Canton of Geneva 
Public Education Act of 6 November 1940 as cited in Dahlab v Switzerland 4-5.  
45  Dahlab v Switzerland 11. 
46  Dahlab v Switzerland 11-12. 
47  Dahlab v Switzerland 14. 
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coercion of young children.48 It was assumed, without any evidence in support 
thereof, that the mere wearing of a headscarf could have a proselytising effect on 
young children, which needed to be curbed. As previously stated, the ECtHR also 
considered the wearing of the headscarf to be incompatible with the principle of 
gender equality as the Qur'an imposes it on women only, and found that the 
prohibition might be necessary to protect gender equality.49 
4. Justifications for a headscarf ban 
The aforegoing analysis of prominent headscarf bans reveals that there are four 
main justifications for banning the headscarf, namely protecting secularism, 
preventing coercion, promoting equality and guarding against religious extremism. 
This section evaluates the veracity of these justifications and whether or not they 
indeed support a headscarf ban.50 
4.1 Secularism 
The protection of secularism is perhaps one of the most popular justifications 
advocated by states and accepted by courts for banning the headscarf. Secularism is 
generally thought to be the separation of religion and state, a principle that requires 
the state to be neutral with respect to religion and not to promote a religious, or 
irreligious, point of view. The state is seen as an "impartial organiser" of the exercise 
of religion, which does not assess the legitimacy of religious beliefs or the way in 
which they are expressed.51 The impartiality of the state is thought to be important 
to prevent the abuse of state power and to ensure that dominantly practised 
religions are not favoured at the expense of minority religions. There is, however, 
some disagreement as to how strict the separation between religion and the state 
should be, and what is required in order to achieve state neutrality. 
48  Dahlab v Switzerland 15. 
49  Dahlab v Switzerland 15. 
50  This article does not examine other peripheral justifications for banning the headscarf such as 
protecting the health and safety of individuals wearing the headscarf or maintaining discipline at 
schools, as these are not frequently relied upon by states and courts. 
51  Leyla Sahin v Turkey 450 para 107. 
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The liberal interpretation of secularism requires a separation of religion and state but 
allows manifestations of religion in the public sphere.52 It accords with the idea of 
passive neutrality in which the state does not support any religion but refrains from 
passing laws that inhibit the practice of religion. Religious symbols in public 
institutions, including schools, are allowed and tolerance of different beliefs is 
promoted.53 The neutrality of the state is that it neither prescribes nor prohibits the 
manifestation of religion but merely allows the expression of religious beliefs without 
any assessment as to the legitimacy of the beliefs. The public manifestation of belief, 
such as wearing a headscarf,54 is allowed but may of course be restricted with 
legitimate reasons. It should thus be clear that in terms of the liberal interpretation 
of secularism, it is not the principle of secularism per se that requires or can justify a 
headscarf ban. 
The strict interpretation of secularism goes beyond the separation of religion and 
state and relegates religion and all manifestations thereof to the private sphere. It 
requires the public sphere to remain absolutely neutral and prohibits all public 
manifestations of religion by public officials or by citizens in public institutions.55 The 
state is entitled to actively protect secularism by legislating against public 
manifestations of religion. The strict separation of state and religion is argued to 
eliminate ethnic differences between citizens and to create a single national identity 
into which all citizens can assimilate56 with the aim of promoting greater social 
cohesion in society57 and avoiding conflict. The absence of any religious 
manifestations is also meant to protect individuals against pressure from religious 
groups and proselytism.58 
The strict interpretation of secularism is problematic for faiths like Islam, which is 
often referred as more than just a religion but as a way of life. Islam prescribes a 
comprehensive code of conduct for every aspect of a Muslim's life. It provides 
52  Plesner "European Court on Human Rights" 2. 
53  Nathwani 2007 NQHR 228. 
54  Nathwani 2007 NQHR 229. 
55  Plesner "European Court on Human Rights" 3. This strict interpretation of secularism accords 
with the French principle of laïcité. 
56  Bienkowski 2010 RJLR 437. 
57  Poulter 1997 OJLS 47. 
58  McGoldrick Human Rights and Religion 13. 
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detailed regulations not only for what Muslims may eat and wear but also regarding 
marriage, inheritance, the punishment of crimes and commercial dealings. Islam 
accordingly attempts to regulate every aspect of a Muslim's life both in the public 
and the private sphere and is hard to reconcile with the notion that religion and all 
manifestations thereof are to be confined to the private sphere. 
Furthermore, the rationale for strict religious neutrality is attractive, but the 
consistency of the argument is questionable. While states often advocate banning 
the headscarf to maintain secularism, these bans often evince a real entanglement 
between state and religion rather than a separation thereof. This entanglement is 
most obvious in prohibitions on religious dress which allow exceptions for certain 
religions. For example, some German states have enacted controversial laws 
prohibiting religious symbols in classrooms but allow exceptions for Christian dress.59 
These laws blatantly discriminate between religions and favour Christianity but have 
been upheld on the basis that Christian values are universal values which inform the 
values of the German Basic Law and to which public officials can adhere regardless 
of their religion.60 The idea, however, that Christian values are universal values is 
problematic and reflects a Western point of view which most non-Christians would 
reject. Such laws furthermore do not promote neutrality but in fact favour and re-
enforce Christianity as the dominantly practised religion at the expense of minority 
religions. This is unfair as it prohibits Muslim school teachers from wearing a 
headscarf while teaching but their Christian counterparts, who enjoy an exception to 
the prohibition, may wear a nun's habit. 
Even seemingly neutral laws may display an unacceptable though more nuanced 
state involvement with religion. So for example the French Headscarf Ban, which is 
couched in neutral terms, was commonly understood to be aimed at preventing 
Muslim girls from wearing the headscarf to school.61 The headscarf is considered to 
be contrary to French values, which are based on Judaeo-Christian values.62 But a 
state's assessment as to the legitimacy of a practice and whether it should be 
59  Lock "Of Crucifixes and Headscarves" 361. 
60  Fogel 2006-2007 NYL Sch L Rev 640. 
61  Barbibay 2010 CJICL 178. 
62  Boustead 2007 J Transnat'l L & Pol'y 169-170. 
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allowed based on its own religious values reveals a real state involvement with 
religion rather than religious neutrality. The French Headscarf Ban is an example of a 
well-crafted law which targets minority religious practices but leaves the favoured 
religion unaffected. 
Similarly, Turkey's headscarf ban is about controlling and regulating the practice of 
Islam. Recently Turkey has allowed greater public manifestations of traditional 
Islam,63 but historically the state has been staunchly secular and has treated Islamic 
conservatism as a threat to the secular state. The state has dealt with this threat by 
controlling and suppressing the practice of traditional Islam in Turkey by regulating 
Islamic education, mosques, the sermons delivered at Friday mosque prayers,64 and 
even political parties.65 The reality is that the Turkish state is heavily involved with 
religion and uses the guise of secularism to coerce women to forgo the traditional 
headscarf and adopt the more modern state version of Islam. 
It is furthermore questionable that the requirement of state neutrality can be 
imposed on public officials. Zhurnalova66 notes that neutrality is a requirement of the 
state and is not an obligation imposed on individuals such as public officials. The 
neutrality requirement should not be extended to individuals simply because they 
are employed by the state, nor should the conduct of state employees be 
automatically attributed to the state.67 It is even more difficult to impose the 
requirement of neutrality onto students who do not represent the state but merely 
63  Most outstanding and noteworthy is Turkey's repeal of a prohibition on headscarves in public 
institutions which dates back to 1925, AFP 2013 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2013/ 
10/turkey-lifts-decades-old-ban-headscarves-201310814177943704.html. 
64  Bleiberg 2005-2006 Cornell L Rev 154. 
65  In 1998 the Turkish Constitutional Court went so far as to dissolve the Turkish political party, 
Refah Partisi, which was part of a coalition government at the time, on the basis that its members 
had endangered the principle of secularism. This drastic measure was in response to acts of 
members which included amongst others changing public service working hours to 
accommodate fasting in Ramadaan and receiving religious leaders at the Prime Minister's 
residence. While the judgment has been severely criticised as being completely disproportionate 
to the impugned conduct, it is indicative of how zealously the Turkish state has guarded against 
the influence of traditional Islam in government. See Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) v Turkey App 
Nos 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98 2002 35 EHRR 3; Boyle 2004 Essex Human 
Rights Review. 
66  Zhurnalova Religion in the Public Sphere 334-335. 
67  The German Federal Constitutional Court in deciding whether or not a school teacher was 
entitled to wear a headscarf in the classroom held that if the state did not order or require the 
dress, the religious dress could not be attributed to the state. See Ssenyonjo 2007 Chinese JIL 
706. 
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use state-provided education. The state should not be said to be endorsing a religion 
simply because it allows individuals, either employees or users of its services, to 
wear religious symbols.68 Lenta69 argues that such allowances merely permit 
individuals to engage in what they consider to be a religiously mandated practice, 
but in no way require or encourage the practice. 
Allowing a headscarf to be worn does not require additional state resources70 or any 
other positive conduct from the state and is therefore distinguishable from where 
the state involves itself in religion by formulating policies that require religious 
symbols to be displayed at schools. Allowing individuals to act in accordance with 
their religious convictions is arguably more in keeping with the notion of secularism 
than dictating whether or not individuals may wear a religious symbol which actually 
entails state involvement with religion.71 State policies that prohibit or mandate the 
wearing of a headscarf are in reality more coercive policies72 which threaten the 
value of secularism. 
4.2 Coercion 
Another popular justification for banning the headscarf is preventing girls from being 
forced into wearing the headscarf or limiting the coercive impact the headscarf may 
have on others who do not wear it. While the prevalence of coercion to wear a 
headscarf may be questionable,73 it is undisputed that where girls are forced to wear 
a headscarf the state should intervene to prevent such coercion. It is not clear, 
however, why or how a headscarf ban will prevent such coercion. The rationale 
68  Lenta 2007 SALJ 310. 
69  Lenta 2007 SALJ 310. 
70  Human Rights Watch 2004 http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/ 
headscarf_memo.pdf. 
71  This is supported by Bleiberg 2005-2006 Cornell L Rev 154. 
72  See memorandum to the Turkish government on Human Rights Watch's concerns with regard to 
academic freedom in higher education, and access to higher education for women who wear the 
headscarf: Human Rights Watch 2004 http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/ 
related_material/headscarf_memo.pdf.24. 
73  There are numerous accounts of females claiming that they voluntarily wear the headscarf and 
protesting against headscarf bans. See Wing and Smith 2005-2006 UC Davis L Rev 764 in which 
they describe the protests against the French Headscarf Ban; Welch 2007 Denning LJ 202 
where Welch notes that women veil for a variety of reasons and there is no evidence to support 
the proposition that women wear the headscarf only due to pressure to do so; nor is there 
evidence to suggest that this is the reason in the majority of cases.  
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behind a headscarf ban appears to be that girls cannot be forced to wear a 
headscarf if it is banned by the state.74 However, it is not clear that the perpetrators 
of coercion will adopt this reasoning. Individuals may nonetheless believe that girls 
have a choice of whether or not to wear a headscarf and whether to wear a 
headscarf even if it means foregoing their education. Girls may now simply be 
prevented from attending school or university if they are not allowed to wear a 
headscarf at these institutions.75 Girls who choose to attend school without a 
headscarf may thus still find themselves to be the victims of abuse and harassment, 
but this time in the form of pressure to forgo their education. 
The state should prohibit the coercion itself rather than enact an obscure headscarf 
ban which may not achieve its purpose. Zhurnalova76 argues that a more 
appropriate solution to coercion is communicating with families and social service 
activities directed at identifying and ending the coercion of girls. The implementation 
of proper disciplinary measures and criminal law enforcement can also prevent 
coercion when in the form of harassment and abuse.77 Weil,78 however, notes that 
these alternative solutions, while preferable, may be practically difficult to achieve. 
Coercion is often hard to identify, prove and sanction, and young victims may also 
be reluctant to identify perpetrators for fear of being ostracised and victimised by 
their community.79 However, the difficulty in implementing these measures does not 
justify enacting a headscarf ban. The alternative measures proposed by Zhurnalova 
are complex and involved, but offer a real solution to what is a deeply-rooted social 
problem which cannot be addressed by a law which focuses on the outcome of 
coercion and not the coercion itself. 
In respect of the coercive impact a headscarf may have on those who do not wear 
it, the argument is often raised and is perhaps most persuasive in a school context 
74  Weil 2009 Cardozo L Rev 2709. 
75  Bleiberg 2005-2006 Cornell L Rev 163. 
76  Zhurnalova Religion in the Public Sphere 158. 
77  Zhurnalova Religion in the Public Sphere 158. 
78  Weil 2009 Cardozo L Rev 2707. 
79  Weil 2009 Cardozo L Rev 2707. 
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where a teacher wears a headscarf while teaching.80 It is the mere wearing of a 
headscarf by a teacher, who occupies a position of authority and acts as a role 
model for students, which is thought to have a coercive effect on students, and it is 
irrelevant whether the teacher actually says anything to promote a religious belief or 
influence students. The situation may be problematic as students are a "captive 
audience" who cannot without some difficulty escape the manifestation of religion, 
for instance by changing class or schools.81 The potential for coercion is heightened 
with young students who may be vulnerable to the views of a teacher and are more 
likely to emulate a teacher's behaviour.82 
While any form of proselytising or coercion may be unacceptable in a school context, 
it is wrong to equate the mere wearing of a headscarf with proselytising or coercion. 
A teacher undoubtedly conveys her religious beliefs to students by wearing a 
headscarf, but there is nothing to suggest that being able to identify the religious 
faith of a teacher induces students to imitate a teacher's religious beliefs. There is no 
evidence in Dahlab v Switzerland or any other case on the effect of wearing a 
headscarf on young children. The absence of real evidence as to the effect a 
headscarf may have on students should preclude assertions that a headscarf 
interferes with the religious freedom of students.83 The coercion which states must 
guard against is when teachers exploit their position of authority, as a representative 
of the school, to influence the religious beliefs of young, impressionable students. 
This possibility exists regardless of whether or not a teacher wears a headscarf, and 
a headscarf ban is a misdirected attempt by the state to guard against such 
coercion. Once again, authorities should focus on the coercion itself rather than the 
headscarf. 
  
80  This argument was also raised in Leyla Sahin v Turkey where the ECtHR held that the wearing of 
the headscarf by Sahin may have a proselytising effect and exert pressure on non-Muslims. Not 
only is it questionable whether Sahin, a university student herself, would be able to exert 
pressure on fellow university students, but the finding conflicts with the ECtHR's finding in 
Kokkinakis v Greece App No 14307/88 (1994) 17 EHRR 397 that proselytism is protected by the 
right to manifest a religion. 
81  Langlaude 2006 Int'l and Comp LQ 930. 
82  Dahlab v Switzerland 15. 
83  Dahlab v Switzerland 15. 
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4.3 Equality 
A more peripheral argument used to justify a headscarf ban is that a headscarf is 
incompatible with equality and that a ban is necessary to protect the rights of 
women. While Weil stated that this is an unacceptable state interpretation of a 
religious practice which breaches state neutrality, it has been relied upon by the 
ECtHR in upholding the ban on the headscarf. The ECtHR, however, has never 
clearly explained why a headscarf is incompatible with gender equality or how the 
ban achieves sexual equality. The headscarf appears to be considered a sexist 
practice as the Qu'ran imposes it women and not men and may result in a woman's 
religiosity being judged according to whether or not she wears a headscarf while a 
Muslim man's religiosity cannot be judged by dress.84 
However, most religions treat men and women differently by imposing different 
religious obligations on them, and such differential treatment has never justified 
legislative interference. For example, the Catholic Church does not allow women to 
be ordained as priests and in terms of Jewish law only a husband may initiate a 
divorce. While these are clearly sexist practices, religious adherents may nonetheless 
voluntarily abide by them in accordance with their religious convictions. Neither the 
state nor the court should prohibit practices voluntarily undertaken in accordance 
with religious beliefs in order to impose equality on religions. 
A headscarf, however, is often treated differently from other religious practices as it 
is viewed as a symbol of Islam's oppression of women, which should be abolished. 
While Muslim women may wear a headscarf to comply with their religious 
obligations, a headscarf is often interpreted very differently by non-Muslims. 
Poulter85 notes that a headscarf is sometimes interpreted to mean that women 
should be inconspicuous, confined to domestic roles and completely segregated from 
men. Furthermore, as the Qur'anic verses quoted earlier in this article suggest that a 
headscarf is a means of protecting women from unwanted interferences, some 
feminists question why men cannot control themselves so that women can dress as 
84  Wing and Smith 2005-2006 UC Davis L Rev 771. 
85  Poulter 1997 OJLS 71. 
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they please.86 A headscarf is seen as isolating women and controlling the sexuality 
of women87 because of the inability of men to control themselves. 
However, the aforegoing interpretation of the headscarf, besides breaching the 
requirement of state neutrality, may also be completely wrong. Muslim women are 
obliged to wear a headscarf only in public. Accordingly, Muslim women are not 
required to stay at home and restrict themselves to domestic roles but may actively 
participate and engage in society provided they wear a headscarf. It is without a 
headscarf that Muslim women are confined to their homes and excluded from 
society. Therefore a ban on a headscarf may actually have the perverse effect of 
excluding Muslim women from society and perpetuating gender inequality. This is 
because a ban on a headscarf has the effect of excluding females who wear a 
headscarf from education or employment simply because of their religious beliefs. 
In fact, McGoldrick88 notes that a headscarf ban has a disproportionate effect on 
Muslim women and actually results in Muslim women being treated unequally. A 
headscarf ban requires Muslim women to forgo fulfilling a religious requirement in 
order to comply with the ban while their Christian counterparts can abide by the ban 
without sacrificing their religious obligations.89 If fairness is understood as not 
requiring the identical treatment of individuals but rather that individuals should be 
treated with equal concern and respect,90 then a headscarf ban is unfair and 
unjustified. This is because a ban does not afford equal concern and respect to the 
religious beliefs of Muslim women who believe they are obliged to wear a headscarf. 
4.4 Religious extremism 
After the attacks on 11 September 2001 on the World Trade Centre, which were 
subsequently attributed to the Muslim organisation Al-Qaeda, a headscarf has also 
become a symbol of religious extremism. While the argument that a headscarf ban is 
86  Wing and Smith 2005-2006 UC Davis L Rev 768-769. 
87  Wing and Smith 2005-2006 UC Davis L Rev 768; see also McGoldrick Human Rights and 
Religion 13. 
88  McGoldrick Human Rights and Religion 252. 
89  McGoldrick Human Rights and Religion 252. 
90  MEC for Education v Pillay 508-509 para 103. 
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necessary to curb religious extremism is tenuous, it is nonetheless addressed as it is 
an emotive argument frequently alluded to in discussions on banning the headscarf. 
A headscarf ban to curb terrorism equates the mere wearing of a headscarf with the 
holding of fundamentalist views.91 This overlooks the fact that Muslim women with 
no connection to terrorism may wear a headscarf to comply with the requirements of 
the Islamic faith. Such blatant racial profiling and prejudice should never justify a 
headscarf ban. Even if it is assumed that Muslim women who wear a headscarf hold 
extremist views, banning the headscarf does not mean that these women will cease 
to hold or spread these views. State action should be directed against the real 
threat, which is religious fundamentalism, and not against the headscarf.92 While it is 
easy to incite people against the headscarf on the basis of stopping terrorism, it can 
never in truth justify a headscarf ban. 
5. A South African perspective 
While the headscarf is becoming an increasingly contentious issue worldwide,93 
South African courts have yet to encounter a headscarf ban. However, there have 
been a number of reported incidents in which Muslim females have been precluded 
from wearing a headscarf in South Africa94 and it may be just a matter of time 
before the legality of a headscarf ban is tested in South African courts. Courts have 
considered various claims for accommodation for other religious practices, which 
may shed light on how South African courts' would respond to a headscarf ban. 
In Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education95 an association of private 
schools claimed an exemption from legislation prohibiting corporal punishment from 
91  Vakulenko 2007 Social and Legal Studies 187; Belelieu 2006 CJEL 619. 
92  Welch 2007 Denning LJ  208. 
93  Just recently a nursing school in Prague in the Czech Republic refused to allow two girls to wear 
the headscarf during classes and the Russian Supreme Court also upheld a ban on Muslim 
headscarves in schools. See Anon 2013 http://praguemonitor.com/2013/11/19/repekt-prague-
schools-hijab-ban-request-unfortunate. 
94  See Lenta 2007 SALJ 296. Lenta discusses the incidents where a social worker was dismissed 
from employment at a South African prison for wearing a headscarf and where a schoolgirl was 
ordered to remove her headscarf as it breached the school's uniform requirements. Also the 
South African Navy Dress Regulations do not make accommodation for a headscarf to be worn 
and may be subject to a possible constitutional challenge in the future. See South African Navy 
date unknown http://www.navy.mil.za/aboutus/uniform/dressregulations/index.htm.  
95  Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 4 SA 757 (CC) (hereafter CESA). 
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being administered in schools on the basis that it conflicted with their Christian 
beliefs and infringed on freedom of religion. The Constitutional Court held that 
individuals have no automatic right to be exempt from generally applicable laws on 
the basis of religious beliefs.96 The court emphasised, however, that the state should 
avoid forcing individuals to choose between complying with the law and adhering to 
their religious beliefs.97 The court ultimately refused the claim for an exemption 
because the legislation was found to serve an important interest, namely the 
protection of children from abuse, degradation and indignity.98 The court took 
seriously the fact that it was the protector of children's interests and that the child's 
best interests are of paramount importance.99 
The Constitutional Court once again refused to grant an exemption in Prince v 
President, Cape Law Society100 when a Rastafarian requested an exemption from 
drug legislation to allow him to use cannabis as part of his religious observance. The 
majority held that the exemption would be impossible to administer and would 
undermine the objectives of the legislation, being the protection of the public from 
the harm arising from drug use.101 Lenta102 criticised the majority's failure to 
consider seriously the possibility of an exemption for Rastafarians. Lenta103 noted 
that when a state prohibits a central practice of a religion it places a severe burden 
on religious adherents forcing them to contravene their religious beliefs or break the 
law. According to Lenta,104 such a situation is discriminatory as adherents of major 
religions are unlikely ever to be placed in such a predicament. While the court 
refused to grant the exemption in CESA and Prince, the cases illustrate that any 
claim for an exemption will be balanced carefully against the countervailing state 
interest, and religious adherents will not be allowed to rely on their religious beliefs 
to infringe on the rights of others or important societal goals. 
96  CESA 779 para 35. 
97  CESA 779 para 35. 
98  CESA 785-786 para 50. 
99  CESA 780-781 para 41. See also Lenta 2008 Constitutional Court Review 263.  
100  Prince v President, Cape Law Society 2002 2 SA 794 (CC) (hereafter Prince v President).  
101  Prince v President, Cape Law Society 841-844 par 130-139. 
102  Lenta 2008 Constitutional Court Review 267. 
103  Lenta 2008 Constitutional Court Review 267. 
104  Lenta 2008 Constitutional Court Review 267. 
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The Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal have more recently 
demonstrated a willingness to accommodate religious practices. In MEC for 
Education, Kwazulu Natal v Pillay,105 the school authorities refused to grant a Hindu 
pupil, Sunali, an exemption from the school dress code in order to allow her to wear 
a nose stud which she claimed formed part of her Hindu religion and culture. The 
respondent in defence of its refusal argued that an exemption would undermine 
discipline at the school and consequently the quality of education provided.106 While 
the court acknowledged that the uniform served an "admirable purpose", it held that 
the objective of the uniform would not be undermined by granting cultural and 
religious exemptions.107 The court emphasised that equality does not require 
treating all people the same but rather treating people with equal concern and 
respect.108 A uniform code without any exemptions for cultural and religious 
practices may relegate individuals who do not conform to mainstream social norms 
to the margins of society and hinder their ability to participate and enjoy their rights 
equally.109 
The Constitutional Court held that the school's refusal to grant Sunali an exemption 
constituted unfair discrimination and that the dress code should be amended to 
provide for the reasonable accommodation of religious and cultural practices.110 
However, the Constitutional Court emphasised that exemptions would not be 
granted for every claim for religious accommodation and that the decision to grant 
an exemption would entail a proportionality analysis.111 Lenta112 explains that the 
proportionality analysis entails examining whether the claimant has a genuine belief 
in the practice, the sincerity of the claimant and the nature and severity of the 
burden imposed on the claimant's religious freedom. On the other hand, the court 
will balance the competing interest in the application of the uniform rule and 
105  MEC for Education v Pillay. The claim was brought under the Promotion of Equality and 
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000, but the Constitutional Court held that there 
may be an overlap between the Equality Act and the rights to religion and cultural life where the 
discrimination results from an interference with a person's cultural life 
106  MEC for Education Kwazulu-Natal v Pillay 507 para 96. 
107  MEC for Education Kwazulu-Natal v Pillay 508 para 101. 
108  MEC for Education Kwazulu-Natal v Pillay 508-509 para 103. 
109  MEC for Education v Pillay 500-501 para 73-74. 
110  MEC for Education v Pillay 512 para 117. 
111  MEC for Education v Pillay 501 para 76. 
112  Lenta 2008 Constitutional Court Review 272. 
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whether granting an exemption would be practically difficult to administer or 
undermine the objectives of the rule.113 This ensures that only genuine religious 
practices are accommodated and that exemptions do not create unmanageable 
situations for institutions to administer. 
In Department of Correctional Services v POPCRU114 the Supreme Court of Appeal 
considered whether the dismissal of correctional officers who wore dreadlocks and 
refused to cut their hair in conflict with the Department of Correctional Services' 
dress code was unfair. Three of the respondents explained that the hairstyle was a 
manifestation of their Rastafarian religion while the remaining two stated that they 
wore it in accordance with their Xhosa culture.115 The respondents' evidence was not 
disputed and in the Supreme Court of Appeal the appellant conceded that the dress 
code was discriminatory on religion, culture and gender.116 
The appellants, however, argued that the discrimination was justifiable as it aimed 
to eliminate the risk and anomaly of having officers working in prisons who adhered 
to a religion or culture that promoted illegal drug use.117 The appellants argued that 
the problem was not the hairstyle but rather the Rastafarianism faith and Xhosa 
cultural practice, which required them to use the illegal and harmful dagga in their 
observance.118 The risk was that the dreadlocks made them easily identifiable and 
open to manipulation by other inmates to smuggle dagga into prisons which would 
undermine the discipline and rehabilitation of inmates.119 
113  Lenta 2008 Constitutional Court Review 272; for an overview of the South African approach to 
state school learner dress codes see De Waal, Mestry and Russo 2011 PELJ. 
114  Department of Correctional Services v POPCRU 2013 4 SA 176 (SCA) (hereafter Department of 
Correctional Services v POPCRU).  
115  Department of Correctional Services v POPCRU 79 para 6-7. 
116  Department of Correctional Services v POPCRU 180 para 12, 182 para 18. The dress code 
discriminated on the basis of gender as it allowed females to wear dreadlocks and the 
respondents would not have been dismissed had they been female. 
117  Department of Correctional Services v POPCRU 182 para 19. 
118  In terms of Xhosa culture an individual wears dreadlocks temporarily in response to his ancestors 
call to become a traditional healer and the dreadlocks are shaved in a ceremony involving the 
use of dagga, signifying the individual's transition into a traditional healer. Department of 
Correctional Services v POPCRU 180 para 11; 182 para 19. 
119  Department of Correctional Services v POPCRU 182 para 20. 
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The SCA noted that discrimination on a listed ground, such as religion, culture and 
gender, is presumed to be unfair and the employer must prove the contrary.120 In 
determining whether the discrimination is fair or unfair the court will consider the 
position of the victim in society, the purpose of the discrimination, the existence of 
less restrictive means to achieve the purpose, the extent to which the victim's rights 
had been infringed, and the impact on the victim's human dignity.121 The SCA held 
that the dress code had a profound impact on the respondents, as adherence to 
their sincerely held beliefs had cost them their jobs.122 The discrimination may, 
nonetheless, have been fair if it was based on inherent requirements of the job.123 
The appellants, in what was a poorly argued case, failed to establish this. The 
appellants' oral argument, that the dreadlocks rendered them vulnerable to 
manipulation and corruption, was different to their argument in evidence that the 
dress code was necessary to entrench uniformity and neatness, which would 
promote discipline and security in prisons.124 Accordingly the SCA, critical of the 
change in argument and the lack of evidence to support the oral argument, 
dismissed the appeal. However, the poor manner in which the case was argued 
means that it is devoid of any real balancing of competing interests. It nonetheless 
demonstrates that the court takes seriously the balancing exercise and will not 
accept unconvincing and unsubstantiated arguments to justify discrimination. 
In the light of the above, it is arguable that South African courts will expect schools 
and employers to accommodate the headscarf.125 First, the earlier discussion in this 
article on the centrality of the headscarf in the Islamic faith and that it is generally 
considered a mandatory requirement in Islam demonstrates the importance of the 
headscarf to Muslim females. The question of whether Muslim females will be 
entitled to have their religious beliefs accommodated will depend on balancing the 
religious interests of Muslim women against the conflicting interests in banning the 
headscarf. 
120  Department of Correctional Services v POPCRU 182 para 21. 
121  Department of Correctional Services v POPCRU 182-183 para 21. 
122  Department of Correctional Services v POPCRU 183 para 22. 
123  Department of Correctional Services v POPCRU 183 para 23.  
124  Department of Correctional Services v POPCRU 183 para 24. 
125  See also Lenta 2007 SALJ, where he convincingly argues that schools and employers are 
obliged to accommodate the headscarf. 
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Secondly, the popular reasons for banning a headscarf scrutinised in this article are 
unlikely to justify a headscarf ban in South Africa. South Africa does not ascribe to 
the strict interpretation of secularism or aspire to create a single national identity for 
all its citizens. The South African Constitution, which provides for eleven official 
languages, allows religious observance in state institutions and protects both the 
individual and group right to culture, promotes inclusivity and accommodates 
difference.126 This means that the protection of secularism is unlikely to be a valid 
justification in South Africa. Furthermore, the connection between banning the 
headscarf and the goals of preventing coercion, promoting equality and curbing 
religious extremism is weak and does not justify the ban. This article aptly 
demonstrates that a headscarf ban is unlikely to achieve any of these goals. 
Thirdly, with regards to prohibiting the headscarf to maintain a uniform dress code, 
it is arguable that an exemption for the headscarf would not undermine the 
objectives of a uniform dress code or be difficult to administer. Schools and 
employers can easily prescribe the colour and type of headscarf and the manner in 
which it is worn. This could very easily accommodate the religious beliefs of Muslim 
females and maintain the neatness and uniformity of a dress code without placing 
an undue burden on the institution. An exemption for the headscarf, unlike in the 
CESA and Prince cases, would not infringe on the rights of others or undermine the 
objectives of a uniform. The failure to grant an exemption would, however, hinder 
Muslim females who wear a headscarf from accessing education or employment and 
may as in the Pillay case constitute unfair discrimination. This is particularly harsh 
given the mandatory status of the headscarf in Islam and the ease with which it 
could be accommodated. FIFA demonstrated how easily the headscarf could be 
accommodated when in July 2012 it lifted its ban on head covers. FIFA stated that it 
would allow female players to wear a specially designed headscarf that satisfied their 
religious requirements and addressed FIFA's safety concerns.127 Sikh male players 
126  For example ss 6, 15, 30 and 31 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
127  CNN 2012 http://articles.cnn.com/2012-07-06/worldsport/sport_soccer-headscarf-ban_1_ 
headscarf-asian-football-confederation-muslim?_s=PM:WORLDSPORT. 
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were also allowed to cover their heads with a basic head cover in the same colour as 
the team jersey.128 
  
128 CNN 2012 http://articles.cnn.com/2012-07-06/worldsport/sport_soccer-headscarf-ban_1_ 
headscarf-asian-football-confederation-muslim?_s=PM:WORLDSPORT. 
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6. Conclusion 
While a headscarf ban is hailed as a solution to a number of problems, I have sought 
to illustrate that a headscarf ban is not justifiable. A headscarf ban is in reality 
rooted in two antithetical stereotypes, namely that Muslim women need to be 
rescued from the oppressive Islamic faith and that Muslim women with a headscarf 
pose a terrorist risk to the world. In this regard, the increase in the number of laws 
prohibiting the wearing of a headscarf should be understood in the current political 
and social context. After September 11, the fear of terrorism has been translated 
into Islamophobia and a headscarf ban is often an attempt to suppress the Islamic 
practices which are viewed as threatening to Western values. The truth is that state 
policies that prohibit women from wearing headscarves are as problematic as state 
policies that compel women to wear headscarves. They hinder an individual's ability 
to adopt a freely undertaken practice and limit autonomy. Accordingly, I have 
argued that such bans are unjustifiable and South African courts if faced with such a 
ban should require employers and schools to accommodate the headscarf. 
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